Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1975

Melvin L. Matlock v. Government Employees
Insurance Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard W. Campbell; Olmstead, Stine and Campbell; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
L. L. Summerhays; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Matlock v. Government Employees Insurance Company, No. 14107.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/183

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

45.9
•S9

'

a&€F

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

****mJ#£oyjt-

2ME COURT

SEP 17 1976

OF XHt a m x E OF UTAH

f
"MELVIN L. MATLOCK,

BRIGMAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

*

Plaintiff and
Respondent^

C a s e N o . 60174

-vsGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant,

i
T

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County
<
Honorable John F . %
"Wahlquist,
Judge

L. L. SUMMERHAYS of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
RICHARD W . CAMPBELL Of
OLMSTEAD, STINE AND CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondeat
dSit
J

FILED
AUG2 91975
ci«£ s«^Tc^nStafc"

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN L. MATLOCK,
Case No. 60174

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vsGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge

L. L. SUMMERHAYS of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL of
OLMSTEAD, STINE AND CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I.

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY FOR A NEWLY ACQUIRED
VEHICLE COMMENCED ON THE DATE THE ONE AND
ONE-HALF TON TRUCK WAS PUT INTO OPERATIONAL
USE RATHER THAN FROM THE DATE OF ACQUISITION .

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE 1951 CHEVROLET ONE AND ONEHALF TON TRUCK QUALIFIED AS A FARM VEHICLE
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY AND THAT THE
30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE, THEREFORE,
APPLIED

17

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE APPLIED
UNDER THE POLICY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT ALL
OF PLAINTIFF'S PASSENGER, FARM AND UTILITY
VEHICLES WERE NOT INSURED WITH GEICO AS
REQUIRED BY ITS POLICY

20

POINT TV. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY HAD
WAIVED ITS RIGHTS OR WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY
COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY BECAUSE OF ITS
CONDUCT IN INVESTIGATING THE ACCIDENT

22

CONCLUSIONS

33

CASES
Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. v . Southern Surety C o . ,
225 Mo. App. 712, 39 S.W.2d 434 (1931)
.

15

Page
Auto Lease C o . v . Central Mutual Insurance C o . , 7 Utah 2d
336, 325 P.2d 264

21

Berqer v . Aetna Life Insurance C o . , 95 N . Y . S . 541

32

Buchanan v . Switzerland General Insurance C o . , ( W a s h . ,
1969), 455 P.2d 344
Buswell v . Biles, 205 So.2d 165 ( L a . , 1968)

26,31
18,19,21

Commercial Standard Insurance C o . v . Universal Underwriters,
282 F.2d 24 ( I 9 6 0 , 10th Circuit, Okla.)

10

DeSear v . Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance C o . , (1967,
5th Circuit), 381 F.2d 367 (Fla.)

21

Everlv v . C r e e c h . 294 P.2d 109 (Calif., 1956) . . . . . . . .
Tackson v . Tames, 97 Utah 4 1 , 89 P.2d 235

12,13
13

Tohnson v . Richard, 445 F.2d 1025 (1971, Utah) .

16,17

Matthews v . Marquette Casualty C o . , 152 So.2d 577 . . . .

14,15

Mitcham v . Travelers Indemnity C o . , 127 F.2d 27 (4th C i r . ,
1942)

14

Reynolds v . Travelers Insurance C o . , (Wash.)., 28 P.2d
310
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .

26

Rosengrant v . National Mutual Assurance C o . , 76 P a . D .
and C . 188

32

State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance C o . v . Richard Kay and
Myrtle Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 (July, 1971) . 27,28,29,30
State Farm Mutual Insurance C o . v . P e a r c e , (1968, N e b . ) ,
157 N . W . 2 d 399

27

United States Fidelity & Guaranty C o . v . Minault, 72 A.2d
161 (1950, N . H.)

11/12

Western Casualty and Surety C o . v . Lund, 234 F.2d 916
(1956, 10th Circuit, O k l a . )
Williams v . Standard Accident Insurance C o . , 322 P.2d 1026
(1958, Calif.)

15,16,17

H

Page
Wisbey v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance C o . , (1973), 507
P.2d 17 (Ore.)
Zick v. Boston Casualty C o . , 185 N.E.362, 282 Mass. 491 .

10,11
32

TEXTS AND STATUTES
§1135, 29A American Jurisprudence Insurance, P. 289 . . . .

30

Appleman, Vol. 4, Insurance Law & Practice, §2105, P. 8 . .

18

Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7, §4293, P. 91 . .

9

Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7, §4293,
P. 84, 85

21

16A Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, §9081, 9088

26

34 A.L.R.2d Annotation, Automobile Insurance, 936, §7 . . . .

14,16

18 Couch on Insurance 2d §61-16

26

18 Couch on Insurance 2d §71-35

31

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §41-l-l(u)

13

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §41-1-77

13

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ,§31-19-34

25,26

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN L. MATLOCK,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
C a s e No. 60174
-vsGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiff insured,
a g a i n s t the defendant insurer, to determine coverage rights of the insured and
insurer under a Family Automobile Policy with r e s p e c t to a 1951 Chevrolet one
and one-half ton truck purchased on January 5 , 1973 but not licensed or used
until April 6, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The c a s e was tried to the court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist,
District Judge p r e s i d i n g .

From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff insured, the

defendant a p p e a l s .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, a p p e l l a n t , s e e k s reversal of the judgment and judgment
in its favor a s a matter of l a w .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiff insured
a g a i n s t the defendant insurance company asking that an endorsement i s s u e d by
the defendant to plaintiff effective the 8th day of April, 1973, to p l a i n t i f f s
insurance policy be declared in full force and effect a s of April 7, 1973 so a s
to cover a one car accident which occurred on the 7th day of April, 1973, in the
area of Delta, Colorado and involved a 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton
truck.
At the time the declaratory action was filed it was primarily for the
purpose of determining the insurance company's responsibility to pay the medical
bills of James Horton, the driver of t h e one and one-half ton truck.

The suit was

commenced with service of summons on the Insurance Commissioner on June 19,
1974. In September, 1974, a suit was filed by James Horton a g a i n s t Dr.
Matlock for damages for injuries arising out of the one car a c c i d e n t .

The defense

of this suit was tendered to GEICO (R. 116) which had a s of May 6, 1974 denied
coverage.

GEICO declined to defend the Colorado suit which i s being presently

defended by counsel hired by the company which i s s u e d Dr. Matlock's Farm
Liability Policy.
Dr. Melvin Matlock first acquired insurance with Government Employees
Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to a s "GEICO" in t h e 1950's (R. 1 2 3 ;
s e e a l s o Exhibit " O " ) .

During the period from the purchase of his first policy to

the occurrence involved in t h i s lawsuit he changed vehicles many times (R. 123,
L. 17). In 1964 he acquired a fruit farm in D e l t a , Colorado, which then became
known a s the M & M Orchards (R. 124, L. 1). At that time he owned a 1963
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Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck which was insured about August 12,
1963 under his then existing GEICO policy No, 506-14-76-1. This vehicle was
placed on the farm for farm use sometime after May of 1964 (R, 119). At the
time he transferred the 1963 Chevrolet pickup truck to the farm he also had one
or more passenger vehicles insured with GEICO (R. 124, L. 10). These vehicles
were insured on the same policy (R. 134, L. 9). He had a 1963 Chevrolet
Corvette which was insured with GEICO and which was involved in a serious
accident in 1965 in Ogden, Utah (R. 128, L. 14) and he had a 1967 Pontiac
which was insured with GEICO (R. 124; see Exhibit "D-7 n ).
On October 1, 1970 he advised the company in writing that the 1963
Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck had been traded in on a 1971 Ford pickup
truck and asked that it be covered under policy No. 506-14-76-1 with the same
coverage as the Chevrolet had (Exhibit "D-4").
On August 21, 1972 Dr. Matlock wrote a letter from Pocatello, Idaho
requesting coverage on a 1972 Chevrolet three-quarter ton pickup truck on which
he had a nine and one-half foot camper, which vehicle and camper were kept in
Pocatello, Idaho. Coverage was to be under the same policy, 506-14-76-1
(Defendant's Exhibit " D - l " , R. 121, L. 22). This vehicle was at the time insured
with Security Mutual Insurance Company, He did not hear from GEICO and wrote
a reminder letter on October 7, 1972 because he had not heard from them
(Defendant's Exhibit 2). When he did not hear from the company immediately/
he renewed the existing coverage on the vehicle with Security Mutual Insurance
Company. This was one of three vehicles he had insured with Security Mutual
Insurance Company prior to January 1, 1973 and continuously through April of
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1973 (R. 121, 122, 94).
On December 29, 1972 GEICO wrote Dr. Matlock a letter acknowledging
receipt of notice that Dr. Matlock had insured the 1972 three-quarter ton pickup
truck and camper with another company and asked that he advise GEICO when he
covered the 1972 Chevrolet with another firm so that they could correct his policy
coverages for the 1971 Ford without lapse (Exhibit

l,

D-3 n ).

GEICO had, in fact, issued coverage on the 1972 Chevrolet with camper
and sent a policy endorsement to him along with a billing which he returned
explaining he had taken insurance with another company (Plaintiffs Exhibit "P",
P. 2; also Exhibit "B"). The company inadvertently continued for a time to bill
him for coverage on this vehicle, and he wrote several letters trying to straighten
the billing out (R. 117, 133).
All of the vehicles, both those on the farm and those he had at his home
or office were registered in his name (R. 130).
On January 5, 1973 he purchased from North Ogden Canning Company
in his name a 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck (R. 131, Plaintiffs
Exhibit "DD," "EE," and Defendant's Exhibit 6). North Ogden Canning Company
was closed down at the time and in the process of being sold (R. 132). A check
dated January 9, 1973 drawn on the M & M Orchards account for the sum of $750.00
and signed by Melvin L. Matlock was issued to North Ogden Canning Company
in payment for the vehicle (Exhibit " 0 - 6 " ) . The title was endorsed by Leslie E.
Randall, president of the North Ogden Canning Company on January 5, 1973
(Exhibit "DD"). Mr. Randall was an uncle of Mrs. Matlock (R. 132). The vehicle
was not licensed at the time of purchase and had not been used during 1972
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(R. 130, L. 18). It remained in the shed where it was parked at North Ogden
Canning Company until April 6, 1973, while the keys were apparently left in
the vehicle and the shed was enclosed inside a locked fence area. As far as
North Ogden Canning Company was concerned, Dr. Matlock could have removed
the vehicle at any time (R. 130, L. 4), Dr. Matlock testified that the title was
sent to him or given to him by Mr. Randall, the president of North Ogden
Canning Company some time during the period January to March, 1973 (R. 130),
and the registration was also apparently given him at the same time (R. 136).
The title was sent to his employee, James Horton, at Delta, Colorado some time
after Dr. Matlock received it (R. 88).
Mr. Horton acquired a Colorado certificate of title to the truck in the
name of Melvin L. Matlock (Exhibit "BB") as of April 6, 1973 and flew to Ogden
to drive the truck back to Delta, Colorado. He and Dr. Matlock went to the
North Ogden Canning Company, got the truck out of the building in which it was
parked and on April 7th about noon Mr. Horton departed Ogden and was involved
in a one car accident near Delta, Colorado about 10:00 p.m. on April 7, 1973.
At about 6:00 p.m. on April 7, 1973 he mailed a letter advising the company he
had purchased and put in service effective that date a used one and one-half ton
truck which he would like insured for liability only with the same coverage as
the Ford truck had under Policy No. 506-14-76-1 (Plaintiffs Exhibit "I").
He received a call from James Horton1 s son at about 11:30 p.m. on the
7th of April advising him of the accident and that his father was in the hospital
in Grand Junction, Colorado.
A few days later Dr. Matlock wrote a letter to GEICO advising them
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that the a c c i d e n t had occurred.
Dr. Matlock c o n t a c t e d , or was contacted shortly after the accident b y ,
McMillan Claims Service in Grand Junction, Colorado and subsequently Miles
Hollcraft Company, claims adjusting company in Ogden, Utah,also contacted
him regarding the claim (R. 9 8 , 99). In December, 1973, or early 1974, and it
could have been earlier, one of Hollcraft 1 s representatives called on him and
took a history of the information he had pertaining t o the truck accident and
coverage questions (R. 136, 137; a l s o Exhibits "FV "X," " E , " and " D " ) .
On January 22, 1974 a non-waiver of rights letter was mailed to Dr.
Matlock by GEICO (Plaintiffs Exhibit "Z"), and on May 6, 1974 a denial of
coverage letter was sent to Dr. Matlock (Plaintiffs Exhibit "AA"), whereupon
t h i s declaratory judgment action was filed by plaintiff.
On May 25, 1973 he received a letter from GEICO f s Washington office
requesting additional information pertaining to the l o s s (Plaintiffs Exhibit " M " ) .
At this time GEICO was in the p r o c e s s of setting up a new claims office in San
Francisco to service the Western States which included Colorado and Utah. Later
he was told that his claim had been transferred to the San Francisco office
(R. 117, L. 22).
On June 8, 1973 GEICO i s s u e d a general change endorsement effective
April 8, 1973 to Policy N o . 5 0 6 - 1 4 - 7 6 - 1 extending coverage on the 1951 Chevrolet
one and one-half ton truck (Exhibit " B " , R. 99). The policy period on t h i s policy
was from March 3 0 , 1973 to March 3 0 , 1974 (Exhibit "B"). Until the one and
one-half ton truck was insured by t h e company on April 8, 1973 Dr. Matlock had
never insured a truck other than a one-half or three-quarter ton pickup variety
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(R. 142,143).
The insurance policy under Definitions, Part I, with respect to owned
automobile provides as follows:
"Owned Automobile" means
(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in
this policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that
coverage is afforded,
•k "k ic

(c) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile, ownership of
which is acquired by the named insured during the policy
period, provided:
*

rk

*

(2) the company insures all private passenger, farm and
utility automobiles owned by the named insured on the
date of such acquisition and the named insured notifies
the company within 30 days after the date of such
acquisition of his election to make this and no other
policy issued by the company applicable to such
automobile.
"Private Passenger Automobile" means a four wheel private passenger,
station wagon or jeep type automobile;
"Farm Automobile" means an automobile of the truck type with a load
capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less not used for business or
commercial purposes other than farming;
"Utility Automobile" means an automobile, other than a farm
automobile, with a load capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less
of the pickup body, sedan, delivery or panel truck type not used
for business or commercial purposes.
The trial court ruled:
1. That the 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck was not under
the terms of the policy acquired nor did it become an owned automobile by the
insured until he registered it in his name and took operational control on the 6th
of April, 1973, the day before the accident.
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2.

That the provision in the policy limiting the automatic 30-day

coverage with respect to farm vehicles to those having a load capacity of 1,500
pounds or l e s s , is an approximate guide l i n e , not enforced by the defendant in
the p a s t and that in any event the controlling word is a farm v e h i c l e .
The court further stated that one-half ton and three-quarter ton pickup trucks are
often loaded with more than 1,000 or 1,500 pounds and the one and one-half ton
truck was to be used in connection with the orchard and w a s , therefore, a farm
vehicle within the meaning of the p o l i c y .
3 . That the plaintiff had been led by the defendant insurance company
to believe that the defendant would provide a defense and make the n e c e s s a r y
investigation to adequately defend the claim and that plaintiff had been prejudiced
in this r e s p e c t and is in no position to adequately take over the defense of the
pending action and further that the reservation of rights and denial of coverage
were not timely.
From t h e s e rulings and findings and any others which the court made
supporting its d e c i s i o n , the defendant files this a p p e a l .
ARGUMENT
POINT I .

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY FOR A NEWLY ACQUIRED
VEHICLE COMMENCED ON THE DATE THE ONE AND
ONE-HALF TON TRUCK WAS PUT INTO OPERATIONAL
USE RATHER THAN FROM THE DATE OF ACQUISITION.

The term "owned automobile" is defined in Part I of the GEICO policy
a s follows:
(c) a private p a s s e n g e r , farm or utility automobile, ownership of
which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period
provided:

(2) The company insures all private passenger, farm and utility
automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of such
acquisition and the named insured notifies the company within
30 days after the date of such acquisition of its election to
make this and no other policy issued by the company applicable
to such automobile.
In attempting to determine whether the plaintiff actually notified the insurance
company within the 30 day period, the critical issue hinges on the question of
when the plaintiff acquired the 1951 truck. The key phrase to determining the
question of coverage is "day of acquisition." Since the terms of the insurance
policy do not specifically state what constitutes "date of acquisition" or ownership of the automobile, it is necessary to examine several cases and other
authorities in this field.
Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7, §4293, P. 91 states:
Where the policy states in such provision that coverage is afforded
when the insured acquires ownership, it means such ownership as
the ordinary man would contemplate by such term, that i s , the
right of user and such an interest in its protection that goes with
a sense of ownership . . . And even the term "acquired" has been
held to mean that the insured must have gained some title to the
vehicle, it not referring to a mere temporary use without claim
of ownership.
In defining the term "acquired ownership" the court looked at such
factors as dominion, control, use and the intentions of the parties.
Although the insured, Melvin Matlock, made arrangements to purchase
the automobile in January, 1973, he allegedly did not take actual possession of
the automobile until approximately April 6, 1973 . He did have constructive
possession.

No one else used the vehicle. It was stored for his benefit.

Although it was in a locked fence area, he could have taken it whenever he desired
(R. 130, L. 4). The title was endorsed on the date of sale by the owner on
January 5, 1973. In attempting to determine when the automobile was "owned"

_ Q _

most courts have held that p o s s e s s i o n is not a requirement of ownership.

In

Commercial Standard Insurance C o . v . Universal Underwriters, 282 F.2d 24
(I960, 10th Circuit, O k l a . ) , the insured had purchased a new automobile and
had paid the entire purchase price t o the automobile a g e n c y , but had agreed to
pick up the automobile a t a later date pending the addition of certain a c c e s s o r i e s
on the automobile.

During the interim period the automobile was involved in an

a c c i d e n t when driven by the automobile a g e n c y .

The Tenth Circuit ruled that

where the insured automobile had been traded in on purchase of a new automobile
and the total purchase price was p a i d , but certain additional a c c e s s o r i e s were to
be placed on the new v e h i c l e , and that was done by the automobile a g e n c y ,
whose owner suggested to the husband of the named insured that they take a
drive, and it was during such a drive while the agency owner was operating the
vehicle that the a c c i d e n t occurred, the s a l e had been completed prior to the
a c c i d e n t , and the vehicle was a newly acquired automobile within coverage of
the automobile liability p o l i c y . One of the defenses raised in that c a s e was that
the automobile was not owned by the insured, b e c a u s e the vehicle was not in the
a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n of the insured.

The court, applying Oklahoma law, concluded

that p o s s e s s i o n was not a requirement of ownership.
Another general rule is that a s between the parties t o the
t r a n s a c t i o n , delivery of a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n is not e s s e n t i a l
to effect a transfer of t i t l e u n l e s s so agreed by t h e p a r t i e s .
Pharaoh v . Burnett and Moore, 112 O k l a . 188, 240 P . 743 . . .
And a third general rule is that what shall constitute transfer
of title ordinarily depends upon the intentions of the parties to
be gathered from the facts and circumstances peculiar to the
transaction.
In the c a s e of Wisbey v . Nationwide Mutual Insurance C o . } ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,
507 P.2d 17 p r e . )

an insured who had full control of the inoperable automobile
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from August 20th when he paid for the same and who was involved in a
collision with an uninsured motorist on September 21st was held to have owned
the automobile more than 30 days notwithstanding the automobile remained on
the seller's premises, the certificate of title was not delivered until September
3rd, and seller was not required to deliver tires which was done on September
3rd when the automobile was moved, being towed from the seller's property.
A similar holding was reached in the case of Williams v. Standard
Accident Insurance C o . , 322 P.2d 1026 (1958, Calif.) where at the time of
delivery of the vehicle to the insured the car was inoperable and without wheels
or tires. The insured rebuilt the car, and it was operating at the time of the
accident.
One must take into consideration that liability coverage is not the only
coverage provided by insurance policies, but theft, fire and others may be
involved in the 30-day automatic coverage involved. Automatic coverage i s , therefore, important and must considered even though the car is not being driven on the
highway. Dr. Matlock would have a right and would, no doubt, insist on payment
if the shed where his truck was stored had caught fire and his truck had been
burned or if it had been stolen and he had fire and theft coverage on his policy.
Several Courts have placed primary emphasis on the intentions of
the parties in determining whether ownership has been established. In United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Minault, 72 A.2d 161 (1950, N. H.) action
had been filed by U. S. F. & G. against Minault for a declaratory judgment to
determine whether the insured automobile at the time of the accident was covered
by a liability policy issued by the plaintiff. A decree was entered in favor of the
defendants based on a finding that the plaintiff was liable on the policy; the case

was transferred on plaintiff's exceptions. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that the evidence established that the insured still had title
to the automobile at the time of the accident. The facts of the case revealed
that the defendant Minault had decided in July of 1947 to sell his automobile
for cash to Richard Detscher. After arriving at an agreement in price Detscher
informed Minault that it would be necessary for him to travel to Concord, New
Hampshire in order to obtain the necessary funds to purchase the automobile.
On the way to Concord Mrs. Detscher was involved in an accident, resulting
in a lawsuit. Minault had alleged in the suit that he was not liable because
the automobile was no longer h i s . On the issue of ownership the court said:
The law here is that title passes when the parties intend it
should. Their intention is a question of fact to be determined
from the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and
surrounding circumstances. Id_. 163.
After reviewing all the facts in the case and examining the intentions
of the parties the New Hampshire court ruled that title to the automobile had not
passed to Detscher and thus Minault would be considered the owner and liable
for subsequent injuries.
In summary, the question of ownership is determined by examining
such factors as (1) the intentions of the parties, or (2) the issue of control or
dominion over the automobile. Most courts are in agreement that ownership is
not based on possession or the registration of an automobile.
If the language in the insurance contract is unclear as to the definition
of ownership, courts will frequently turn to motor vehicle statutes for a concise
definition.

This was done by the California Court of Appeals in the Everly v.

Creech, 294 P.2d 109 (Calif., 1956) decision when the court relied on the

i o_

definition of "owner" according to West f s Annotated Civil Code, &1738;
Vehicle Code, §66. If a court should decide that the definition of ownership
is unclear pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract, it would then be
necessary to examine the definition given in the Utah Code Annotated. The
definition of "owner" is found in §41-l-l(u), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It states:
Owner—Person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or in the
eventa vehicle is subject to conditional sale the person with
an immediate right of possession. §41-1-72 states:
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate of
registration and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle
required to be registered shall be deemed not to have been made,
and title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and said
intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be
valid or effective for any purpose except as provided in §41-1-77.
The court, however, has construed the provisions of this section
as not mandatory or controlling in their application. They do not confer or deny
substantive rights. They are procedural or evidentiary in nature and provide a
flag of warning to prospective transferees or encumbrances, much as do the
registry acts relative to real estate and chattel mortgages . See Jackson v. Tames #
97 Utah 4 1 , 89 P. 2d 235.
§41-1-77 provides that the owner of a motor vehicle who has made
a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or interest and who has delivered
possession of such vehicle and certificate of registration and the certificate of
title thereto properly endorsed to the purchaser or transferee shall not be liable
for any damages thereafter resulting from negligent operation of such vehicle by
another.
It is our opinion that, whereas here, it would appear the seller had
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delivered the registration certificate, the endorsed title, and the possession
of the vehicle to Mr. Matlock, he would be deemed to have acquired it under
the terms of the policy.
A second question to consider is the effect of failure to notify the
insurance company within 30 days after acquisition of the automobile. The
general rule is that failure to notify the insurance company within 30 days after
acquisition of the vehicle will result in loss of insurance coverage. 34 A.L.R.2d
Annotation, Automobile Insurance, 936, §7 states:
It is well established that where the "automatic insurance" clause
requires notice of the acquisition of a new automobile to be
given the insurer, within a specified time after delivery, the
period generally being either 10 or 30 days, a failure to give
notice prior to the accident occurring after the expiration of the
designated period precludes coverage of the new automobile.
J d . 943.
In Mitcham v. Travelers Indemnity C o . , 127 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. , 1942)
the court stated that the requirement of notice was of obvious importance to the
insurer, serving to inform it of the identity and character of the vehicle to be
covered and to enable it to exercise the rights reserved to it in the policy and to
ascertain whether the insured had complied with his obligation thereunder, and
that it could not be said that the policy provision was so immaterial to the risk
that it could not be invoked for the purpose of avoiding the company1 s contractual
liability. In Matthews v. Marquette Casualty C o . , 152 So.2d 577 the court said
that the clear impact of the clause insuring additional vehicles from the date of
acquisition provided the insured notifies insurer within 30 days is that automobiles
in addition to that described in the policy are automatically insured for 30 days
following the date of delivery to the insured but that coverage ceases if the insured
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fails to give the required notice to the insurer. The generally accepted rule
is that an automobile which is newly acquired is automatically covered by the
insurance provided the insured notifies the insurance company within 30 days of
the acquisition. Failure to notify the company within that time period will
result in cancellation of the insurance coverage.
Not all courts, however, are in complete agreement with this theory.
In Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. v. Southern Surety C o . , 225 Mo. App.
712/ 39 S.W.2d 434 (1931) the court held that a car received by the insured in
exchange for another car which had been listed in a fleet policy giving automatic
coverage to additional cars purchased by the insured was covered when involved
in an accident some five months after the date of the exchange. The court stated
that the notice provision was not for the purpose of allowing the insurer to say
whether or not it was willing to extend coverage to newly acquired cars, but
was rather intended to protect the insurer in collection of additional premiums on
such cars, and concluded that the provision was not a condition precedent to
coverage, but at most a condition subsequent and since the policy contained
no forfeiture provision for failure to perform the condition, coverage was still
in effect.
Although there appears to be no cases in Utah directly on point, the
Tenth Circuit follows the majority rule that if notice is not given during the 30day period, the coverage terminates at the end of such period. This position
was affirmed in Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Lund, 234 F.2d 916 (1956,
10th Circuit, Okla.) in an action by the insurer against the insured to determine
the obligations and rights under an automobile insurance policy. The Tenth
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that under the policy provisions pertaining to
automatic coverage for newly acquired automobiles, giving of notice of
acquisition was not a pre-requisite to coverage during the 30 day period
provided for, but, if the notice was not given during such period, the coverage
would terminate at the end of such period. The court said:
Under the clear import of such provision, the automatic coverage
becomes effective immediately upon the replacement and
continues for a period of 30 days. The giving of the notice is
not a pre-requisite of coverage during that period. If the notice
is not given during the 30 day period, the coverage terminates
at the end of such period. But the automatic coverage protects
the insured against liability accruing within that period even
though no notice of the replacement is given. Id_. 919.
The final question to consider is whether it is material that
notification was received the day after the accident. According to the facts,
the insured, Melvin Matlock, sent the notification on April 7th, but the
notification did not reach the insurance company until April 8th. The date of
the accident was April 7th. The general rule accepted by most jurisdictions
is that notice is not required to reach the insurance company prior to the accident, but it must reach the insurance company before the expiration of the 30day time limit. According to 34 A.L.R.2d, supra, §7:
In this situation it has been generally held, on the theory that
the requirement of notice is a condition subsequent rather than
a condition precedent to extended coverage, that such coverage
is automatically effected upon delivery of the new automobile
and remains in effect until the end of the specified period,
irrespective of whether notice has been given or not. Id_. 944.
This general rule is also accepted by the Tenth Circuit in Tohnson v.
Richard, 445 F.2d 1025 (1971, Utah). There the court held that under an automobile
liability policy provision pertaining to automatic coverage for a newly acquired
vehicle, giving notice of acquisition would not be a pre-requisite to coverage

during the 30-day period provided for notice and an accident after acquisition
of a different v e h i c l e , but before notice to the carrier did not affect the
automatic coverage provision.

The court said:

In Western Casualty and Surety C o . -.v. Lund, 234 F. 2d 916
(10th Circuit) we held that under a policy with a similar policy
provision, the automatic coverage becomes effective immediately on a replacement of the car and continues for the
noticed period although the insured does not advise the
company one way or t h e other. This appears to be the almost
universal r u l e . Thus an accident after the acquisition of a
different vehicle but before notice to the carrier, does not
affect the automatic coverage provision. In the c a s e before
u s we thus hold there is coverage by Employers on the trailer
a t the time of the accident and a l s o on the c a r . IcT. 1027.
The rule that is accepted by most jurisdictions is that the insured is
covered for the 30-day period, but he must give notification to the insurance
company in order to extend coverage beyond that period.

However, if the

accident should occur during the 30-day period, but before notice is given to
the insurance company, that does not negate the insurance coverage during that
30-day period.
In the instant c a s e t h e insurance would not become effective until
at l e a s t the date the company received and accepted the application which was
on the 8th of April which was the date the company made the endorsement
effective on this particular automobile.
POINT I I . THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THE 1951 CHEVROLET ONE
AND ONE-HALF TON TRUCK QUALIFIED AS A
FARM VEHICLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
POLICY AND THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC
COVERAGE, THEREFORE, APPLIED.
In its memorandum decision and in its findings and conclusions
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the trial court stated that one-half ton trucks and three-quarter ton trucks
are habitually loaded with more than 1,500 pounds and even up to 12,000
pounds; that the one and one-half ton truck was an ordinary farm vehicle when used in
connection with the orchard and was so regarded by the defendant company
until they discovered the existence of the accident claim in question. That
any other interpretation of the policy requirement would subject to no coverage
all farm trucks or vehicles that are used or loaded with regular farm type loads
at any particular time (R. 45,51).
The trial court appears to have missed the point completely on this
issue in the c a s e . The defendant is not and has not claimed that the overloading
of a vehicle takes it out of the policy coverage. The issue here is whether

j
i

under the provisions of the policy the insured is entitled to the benefit of the

i

automatic 30-day coverage provision when the vehicles does not come within

(

the category of those vehicles described in the policy as passenger, farm or

i
i

utility vehicles.
i

It is undisputed that the insurance company is entitled to contract and
fix its obligations and rights under a policy as long as the provisions are not

{

i
i

unreasonable, illegal or contrary to public policy, and such provisions are
i

binding upon both the insurer and insured. Appleman, Vol. 4, Insurance Law

,

& Practice, §2105, P. 8.

I

The insurer in this instance has the right to define

i

the terms passenger, farm and utility vehicles and the parties are bound by their
i

written agreement.
The only load capacity that the contract reasonably could provide for

i
i
i

would be the manufacturer's rated capacity. A case directly in point is Buswell
i

v . Biles, 205 So.2d 165 (La., 1968). In that c a s e the insurance policy contained the exact provisions that are contained in GEICO f s policy under
definitions of an owned automobile, and p a s s e n g e r , farm and utility v e h i c l e .
(These are standard provisions.)
Mr. Biles contended a farm or utility automobile within the terms
of the policy depends upon whether the vehicle had a capacity of 1,500 pounds
or l e s s , and this capacity limitation refers to a c t u a l maximum load c a p a c i t y .
The court said:
It must be conceded the testimony is conclusive that both the
1965 one-half ton pickup and the three-quarter ton pickup were
capable of carrying loads in e x c e s s of 2,000 pounds each
without destroying the v e h i c l e .
The lower court agreed with Biles and held the 1952 Ford three-quarter ton
pickup was not a farm or utility automobile a s defined in the policy b e c a u s e it
was p o s s i b l e for it to haul more than 1,500 p o u n d s .
The appellate court held this was error and stated:
We find from the record that it was the clear intent of both
the insurer and the insured that the load capacity a s
contemplated by t h e s e parties was the manufacturer's
designation of the pickups a s one-half ton and three-quarter
ton t r u c k s .
GEICO did not refuse coverage on the v e h i c l e , but they covered
the one and one-half ton Chevrolet truck a s of the date they received the
application for co/erage rather than giving Dr. Matlock the 30-day automatic
coverage which, under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he was not entitled t o .

The trial

court should have ruled that the vehicle did not qualify for the automatic
coverage.

-19-

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE 30-DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE APPLIED
UNDER THE POLICY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT ALL
OF PLAINTIFF'S PASSENGER, FARM AND UTILITY
VEHICLES WERE NOT INSURED WITH GEICO AS
REQUIRED BY ITS POLICY.
Exhibit "BB" shows definitely that t i t l e to the 1951 Chevrolet was
i s s u e d by the State of Colorado to Melvin L. Matlock, and Mr. Matlock does
not dispute this fact.

All of the v e h i c l e s , both those on the farm and t h o s e

he had at his home or office, whatever the c a s e may b e , were registered in
his name (R. 130).
The policy provisions with respect to a newly acquired vehicle
clearly s e t

forth that the 30-day automatic coverage applies only if the insured

i n s u r e s a l l automobiles owned by the insured a s of the delivery date of an
additional automobile (See Exhibit "A," first page - owned automobile).
P l a i n t i f f s Exhibit

n

C " which is a policy request form h a s in bold

print on the very front of it:
"Important"
Your Policy Provides Automatic Insurance For a Newly Acquired
Automobile, whether it r e p l a c e s one described in your policy
or i s an additional car, provided we insure all automobiles
owned by you a s of the delivery date of an additional a u t o ,
and GEICO is notified within 30 days of delivery.
The purpose of automatic insurance coverage is to give
coverage to persons who are already insured with the company
in question upon acquiring a new v e h i c l e . The coverage extends
to the new acquisition when it r e p l a c e s the sole automobile
owned by the insured, when the insured owns a number of
vehicles and all of them are insured with the company, or
when several of the vehicles owned by the insured are
covered by the policy and the new acquisition r e p l a c e s
one already covered. It does not apply to new vehicles
which are in addition to t h o s e insured by the former
coverages and which are not used a s replacements u n l e s s
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all vehicles of that insured are covered, in which event it is
contemplated that a premium readjustment will be m a d e . . . .
The insurance protection given is also limited to the nature
of the risk originally insured, and is confined to the same
policy period. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Vol. 7,
§4293 P. 84,85.
In the case of Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance C o . ,
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, our court held that where Central Mutual had
issued its policy to Auto Lease Company describing five vehicles which were
leased to Bearing Service, but Auto Lease owned other automobiles which were
not insured by Central Mutual, a vehicle purchased as a replacement for one
of the five cars was not covered under the additional automobile provision of
the automatic coverage clause since Central Mutual did not insure all
automobiles owned by Auto Lease.
See also Buswell v. Biles, supra; and DeSear v. Hardware Dealers
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., (1967 , 5th Circuit), 381 F.2d 367 (Fla.).
There are many cases supporting the holdings of the three cited
c a s e s . Appellant has not found any case holding that the provision restricting
automatic coverage of additional vehicles to those instances where all vehicles
owned by the named insured are insured by the insurer as being unreasonable,
illegal or against public policy.
Plaintiff claims that M & M Orchards is also a named insured, but
this is not true. Dr. Matlock was the owner of the vehicle and the named
insured. M & M Orchards, P. O. Box 6, Delta, Colorado, as appears on
Exhibit "B" is only the address for the farm and the place where the vehicle
was to be used and kept. M & M Orchards was not a corporation or a legal
separate entity but a name under which Dr. Matlock operated his orchard. He
was the sole owner of the vehicle.

He was not entitled under his policy with Security Mutual nor his
GEICO policy t o automatic 30-day coverage for any additional vehicle
acquired by him.
His application for coverage was subject to a c c e p t a n c e by the company,
and was effected by the company on the 8th of April, 1973. They could have
refused t o cover the risk at a l l if they so e l e c t e d .
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY HAD
WAIVED ITS RIGHTS OR WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY
COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY BECAUSE OF ITS
CONDUCT IN INVESTIGATING THE ACCIDENT.
The insurance company i s s u e d its endorsement covering the 1951
Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck on June 8, 1973 effective April 8, 1973
t o Policy N o . 5 0 6 - 1 4 - 7 6 - 1 which had been in effect for many y e a r s , had an
annual premium rate with a policy period that dated from March 30 to March
30 of the following y e a r , with the current policy period for the policy involved
in this accident of March 30, 1973 to March 3 0 , 1974. When the general
endorsement was sent to the insured in June of 1973 he noted the effective
date covering the 1951 truck of 4 - 8 - 7 3 and w a s , therefore, put on notice that
the defendant insurance company was not covering his accident of April 7,
1973.

Plaintiff claims that the policy was corrected on October 29 , 1973 to

show coverage on the 1951 Chevrolet, but the evidence does not show t h i s .
The exhibit (Plaintiffs Exhibit "B") merely shows that the policy period was
from March 30, 1973 to March 3 0 , 1974.
policy period had run for many y e a r s .

These are the same d a t e s that this

Dr. Matlock w a s , therefore, on notice

that he should probably investigate the a c c i d e n t himself.
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H e , however,

together with James Horton were the primary witnesses to the transactions
involving this matter.
Dr. Matlock did talk to the Hortons and James Horton with his
family is still living on the farm property. Until suit was filed by Horton Dr.
Matlock had plenty of opportunity to talk to Mr. Horton. The police officer's
report is available as is also the investigation of GEICO. The declaratory action
was not filed until June of 1974, and the federal action in September of 1974
which is being defended by Dr. Matlock's farm liability carrier. He also had
a letter from McMillan Claims Service, an independent adjuster, dated August
8, 1973 that GEICO could not find a policy verifying coverage for the 1951
Chevrolet and for him to send a copy of his policy to them so they could determine coverage which he was claiming (Plaintiffs Exhibit "D"). The company
was in the process of establishing a claims office in San Francisco to service
the claims for the Western States and this claim was transferred to the San
Francisco office for handling which may have caused some delay in correspondence and handling.
On August 21, 1972 Dr. Matlock applied for coverage under his
GEICO policy on a 1972 three-quarter ton pickup with a camper on it. This
vehicle was at his home in Pocatello, Idaho at the time. He did not hear
from the company with respect to his application and wrote a reminder letter
on October 7, 1972 because he had not heard from them (Defendant's Exhibit
" D - l " , R. 121, and Defendant's Exhibit 2). The company subsequently sent
him a policy covering the 1972 camper, but in the meantime he had renewed
his coverage with Security Mutual Insurance Company and returned the policy
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to GEICO, advising them that he had renewed his coverage with Security.
He did a d v i s e the company he wanted his coverage continued on the 1971
Ford pickup.

The company sent him a letter dated December 29, 1972

acknowledging receipt of his notice that the 1972 Chevrolet w a s covered by
a policy with another company and inquired of him a s to the date it was insured
with the other company so that they could continue the coverage on the 1971
Ford pickup without l a p s e (Defendant's Exhibit 3).
GEICO had, in fact, i s s u e d coverage on the 1972 pickup with
camper and inadvertently continued for a time to bill him for coverage on this
vehicle,and several letters were written by him trying to straighten the billing
out (R. 117, 133).
During this same period of time the investigation of the question of
coverage and the facts of the accident were being checked by McMillan Claims
Service in Grand Junction, Colorado and Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden,
Utah (R. 136 and 137; P l a i n t i f f s Exhibits " E , " " D # " "F" and "X").
On May 25, 1973 the GEICO Washington office sent a letter to him
requesting additional information pertaining to the l o s s (Plaintiffs Exhibit
"M").

He was in touch with McMillan Claims Service after the accident on

several o c c a s i o n s , and then was contacted by a claims representative from
Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden, Utah prior to or in December 1973 or
early January, 1974, who took a history from him and told him, "This should
wrap it "up" (R. 113).
In January, 1974 he received a non-waiver letter dated January 22,
1974 from GEICO's San Francisco office reserving rights in connection with
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the investigation of the accident (Plaintiffs Exhibit "Z") and in May, 1974
a letter from GEICO dated May 6, 1974 denying coverage.
In connection with the medical bills incurred by Mr. Horton, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield under Mr. Horton f s individual policy was paying the
medical bills and paid all of them except for a few which Dr. Matlock paid
(Exhibit "N").

As previously stated, at the time the declaratory action was

filed by the plaintiff no suit had been filed in federal court and it was GEICO1 s
refusal to pay the medical bills which prompted the declaratory action. In
connection with payment of the medical bills a memo was sent by McMillan
Claims Service dated December 19, 1973 to Charles Traylor, an attorney whose
identity or connection with the case is not established, wherein reference is
made to a statement alleged to have been made to Dick Bottinelli, of McMillan
Claims Service, to the effect that Washington had told him they had issued a
draft . The draft was never, apparently, sent.
statement, if made, was never identified.

The person who made the

Mr. Bottinelli, a l s o , apparently

on December 19, 1973, according to the memorandum, was told by a secretary
or someone not identified in the San Francisco office that she would run the
file down and make payment. This was not done, and the identity of the
person was never established. He did advise Mr. Traylor in that memorandum
that it would be necessary for Horton to submit a statement of claim.

Dr.

Matlock readily admitted that the fact that GEICO did not recognize the
coverage

did not influence the amount of the medical bills on Mr. Horton

(R. 132).
Section 31-19-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states as follows:
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None of the following acts by or on behalf of an insurer
shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any provision
of the policy or of any defense of the insurer thereunder;
(1) acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or of
claim under the policy; (2) furnishing forms for reporting
a loss or claim, for giving information relative thereto,
or for making proof of loss or receiving or acknowledging
receipt of any such form of proof filled out; (3)
investigating any loss or claim under any policy or
engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible settlement of any such loss or claim.
In Buchanan v. Switzerland General Insurance C o . , (Wash., 1969),
455 P.2d 344 the court distinguishes between estoppel and waiver:
Waiver, either express or implied, has been defined as the
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right. It is unilateral in that it arises out of either
action or non-action on the part of the insurer or its duly
authorized agents and rests upon circumstances indicating or
inferring that the relinquishment of the right was voluntarily
intended by the insurer with full knowledge of all the facts
pertaining thereto. Citing Hopkins v. Northwestern National
Life Insurance C o . , 41 Wash. 592, 83 P. 1019; Reynolds v.
Travelers Insurance C o . , (Wash.), 28 P.2d 310; and 16A
Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, §9081, 1968; 18 Couch
on Insurance 2d §71-13.
Estoppel, on the other hand, refers to a preclusion from asserting a
right by an insurer where it would be inequitable to permit the assertion. It
arises by operation of law, and rests upon a c t s , statements or conduct on the
part of the insurer or its agents which lead or induce the insured, in justifiable
reliance thereupon, to act or forbear to act to his prejudice. Abatement of the
right or privilege involved by way of estoppel need not be intentionally,
voluntarily or purposely effected by or on the part of the insurer. Reynolds v.
Travelers Insurance C o . , supra; 16A Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, §9081,
9088; 18 Couch on Insurance 2d §71-16.

- 2 5-

An automobile liability insurer was not estopped taden^r coverage
by the fact that it made a complete investigation of the accident which
happened on December 5, 1965, but did not formally disclaim coverage until
June 29, 1966, where the insurer would not know whether its policy provided
coverage until it had determined what facts and circumstances surrounded the
accident. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearce f (1968, Neb.), 157
N.W.2d399.
Estoppel is the equitable doctrine that a party should not be permitted
to repudiate an act done or position assumed where that course would work an
injustice to another who, having ample reason to do so, has relied thereon.
An estoppel may arise even where there is no intent to mislead, as long as
one's conduct is sufficient to induce reasonable reliance upon the part of the
other. The party estopped must have acted with the knowledge of the facts.
However, the final element which must always be present in an estoppel is
a change of position by the relying party with prejudice for injuries suffered as
a proximate cause of such reliance.
There has been no change of position by Dr. Matlock with prejudice
for injuries suffered by him as a proximate cause of any reliance, and it was
encumbent upon the insurer to determine all of the facts to assure itself that
it was not making an error in establishing coverage for the one and one-half
ton truck on April 8, 1973, rather than accepting coverage under the policy on
the 30 day automatic coverage clause.
In the case of State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Richard Kay
and Myrtle Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 (July, 1971) Richard Kay, who
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was 35 years of age and lived with his mother, Myrtle Kay, was riding with
his mother on August 4, 1968 when she either fell asleep or suffered a
blackout and ran her vehicle off the highway and into a dirt embankment.

(

Both sustained severe injuries. The insurance company made payment under
the medical pay provisions of the injuries to both Myrtle Kay and Richard Kay.
Subsequently Richard Kay, through his counsel, asserted a claim for his

'

injuries to State Farm. By letter dated May 1, 1969 a field claim representative
for State Farm notified Richard's counsel of the following exclusion in the
{

policy:
This insurance does not apply under (1) coverage A to bodily injury
to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing
in the same household as the insured; . . . .
On July 15, 1969 Richard filed an action against his mother claiming damages
in the sum of $121,000.00. Myrtle Kay submitted the defense of the action to

!

{
i

i

State Farm and counsel for State Farm filed an answer on August 1, 1969. On

f

August 29, 1969 State Farm took Richard's deposition which was signed by
i

Richard on September 17, 1969 and on October 23, 1969 State Farm filed a
declaratory judgment action asserting that no liability could exist under the
terms of the policy because of the exclusion of coverage of the insured for

,
i
i

bodily injury to a member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household and that inasmuch as there was no coverage, there was no duty to
defend the insured. Defendants asserted that State Farm was estopped to deny

<
i
i

coverage since it unconditionally assumed the defense of Myrtle Kay without

|

taking any reservation of rights, although it possessed knowledge of the defense

•
i

as evidenced by the letter from the field claims representative. The trial court
i

i
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ruled as a matter of law that Myrtle Kay had been prejudiced and that State
Farm was estopped to deny coverage. The plaintiff appealed. Myrtle Kay
claimed that had she known that insurer's counsel would seek to represent
conflicting interests, she would have procured her own counsel initially and
that by her insurer's counsel representing her on her appearance she lost the
right to control and manage her own case and the right to the individualized
attention by counsel of her own choice, and the opportunity to settle or compromise the claim. She concluded that she was induced by State Farm to
refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in her power from
the time of the accident until the matter was set for trial on January 12, 1970.
The court held:
In the instant action there is nothing in the record to indicate
that Mrs. Kay was deprived, by the conduct of State Farm, of
an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense before trial or in
the alternative, to effect a settlement with her son. There were
no assertions that her counsel would have inadequate time to
prepare a defense or that he lacked a reasonable opportunity
to gather and preserve evidence or to institute certain pre-trial
procedures. We are compelled to conclude that the trial court
erred in its determination that Mrs. Kay's interest had been
prejudicially affected by the conduct of State Farm.
In the State Farm v. Kay case our court has, with respect to that
c a s e , followed the rule that there must be actual prejudice, not mere
assertions of prejudice, to hold an estoppel against the insurance company.
In this c a s e , as in ours, the insurance company had made an investigation of
the accident and was aware of the provision in the policy which amounted to an
exclusion, if the facts came within that exclusion. The fact that the company
extended a defense of the c a s e , by filing an answer and taking a deposition
before filing a declaratory action, was held not to constitute an estoppel. In
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other words, the company was allowed to continue its investigation even
though over a year had expired since the time of the accident without being
guilty of conduct amounting to an estoppel.
In the case before this court the lawsuit in Colorado was filed shortly
before the tender of the defense on the 5th of September, 1974. The declaratory
action was filed by plaintiff in June of 1974.
In effect, Dr. Matlock is trying to bring within the coverage of the
insurance policy a risk that is not covered by the terms of the policy in that he
had his cars insured with two companies instead of one which would activate
the automatic 30-day coverage clause. The 30-day automatic coverage was
excluded under those circumstances and also the circumstance that the vehicle,
a one and one-half ton truck, did not come within the provisions of the
definition of owned vehicle under the policy.
In §1135, 29A American Jurisprudence Insurance at p . 289, it
is stated:
The nile is well established that the doctrines of implied waiver
and of estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of the insurer,
are not available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks
not covered by its terms, or risks expressly excluded therefrom,
and the application of the doctrines in this respect i s , therefore, to be distinguished from the waiver of or estoppel to
assert grounds of forfeiture. Thus, while an insurer may
be estopped by its conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon
a forfeiture of a policy, the coverage or restrictions on the coverage
cannot be extended by the doctrine of waiver or estoppel. While
it is true that if the insurer, with knowledge of facts which would
bar an existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability
by treating the policy as in force, he will not thereafter be
allowed to plead such facts to avoid his primary liability, the
doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked to create primary liability
and bring within the coverage of the policy risks not included
or contemplated by its terms.

-30-

On page 13 of the supplement in Couch 2d on Insurance, Vol. 18,
under §71-35 Existence of Contract, it is stated:
Waiver and estoppel cannot create a new contract between the
parties. Scott v. Industrial Life Insurance Co. , 4 1 1 S.W.2d
769. See also Madgett v. Monroe County Mutual Tornado
Insurance Co. ( W i s e ) , 176 N.W.2d 314 where it is also said:
Estoppel cannot be used to create a contract of insurance.
Waiver and estoppel usually cannot operate to extend coverage
where none exists under the contract. Looney v. Allstate Insurance
Co. (8th Cir., Ark.), 392 F.2d 401. To establish a waiver
evidence must show the acts of the insurer constituted a
voluntary intentional relinquishment of a known right and that
insurer had full knowledge of all pertinent facts. Wasilco v.
Home Mutual Casualty Co. (Penn.), 232 A.2d 60. Also see
Buchanan v. Switzerland General Insurance C o . , supra.
With regard to plaintiffs claim that defendant's adjuster made
certain statements which waived exclusions of liability coverage contained
within the policy, defendant cites L. L. Buchanan v. Switzerland General
Insurance C o . , supra. The court in this case did not allow the adjuster to make
any waivers of a policy provision.
Thus, for an independent adjuster, within our statutory framework,
to effect a waiver of a policy or statutory framework, i . e . , an
involuntary and intentional relinquishment of the provision, on the
part of his principal, the insurer, it is necessary to establish
that he was vested with the requisite degree of authority to effect
the waiver.
The court also states that:
[W]e would indulge in no presumptions of authority on the part
of an adjuster permitting him to waive such policy provisions on
the part of an insurer absent proof of such added authority.
There was no evidence submitted in the trial to show that the adjuster
was given such express authority to effect a waiver of policy provisions.
Lacking the presumption of authority or actual authority from the insurer, the
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adjuster was not able to make such a waiver as plaintiff contends that he
did. In additional support to defendant1 s contention of no presumed
authority see Rosengrant v. National Mutual Assurance C o . , 76 Pa. D. and C.

i

188; Berger v. Aetna Life Insurance C o . , 95 N.Y.S. 541; andZick v. Boston

f
i

Casualty C o . , 185 N.E. 362, 282 Mass. 491.
i

There was no proof that McMillan Claims Service had been authorized
to waive any rights that the company had. Exhibit "F" does not constitute such

*
•

a waiver and, in fact, is- not even addressed to Dr. Matlock. No particular
I

employee of GEICO was identified except the secretary who was going to look

i

for the file. The exhibit was introduced over the objection of defendant.

f

See

i

(R. 108, 109).
There was no evidence to show that Dr. Matlock had, in fact, been

<

prejudiced by the investigation of the company in connection with its
l

investigation. He was put on notice initially that the coverage was placed
the day after the accident. He knew that the investigation was under way and

'
i

was continuing and, in fact, received a request for additional information
i

directly from GEICO and was also requested to furnish additional information

p

through McMillan and through Miles Hollcraft Company in Ogden even into

"

December of 1973. The investigation was complicated somewhat by the fact
that the participants involved resided in two different states and also by the

i

p

fact that GEICO was in the process of setting up a Western office at San
Francisco to handle the Western States claims. However, the federal court
suit

was not filed until September of 1974 some three months after the

p

i

declaratory action was begun by the insured. He, therefore, had plenty of
i
i
i
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time to conduct his investigation and to use the necessary discovery procedures in connection with the federal court c a s e . As a matter of fact,
counsel for his farm liability carrier is handling that defense. It i s , therefore,
respectfully submitted that there was neither waiver by the insurance company
nor the basis for an estoppel against it.
CONCLUSIONS
Defendant respectfully submits that the defendant insurer was
entirely within its rights under the terms of the policy in placing the insurance
on the one and one-half ton truck on the 8th day of April because the truck did
not qualify as an owned automobile under the terms of the policy and also
because the insured did not have all of the vehicles registered in his name
insured with GEICO, The 30-day automatic coverage provision, therefore,
never came into play.
There is no evidence that the company waived any of its rights under
the policy or was guilty of conduct which would estop it from standing upon
those rights.
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff insured should be reversed
and judgment entered on behalf of the defendant that coverage did not exist
for the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
By
L. L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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